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ECONOMIC SALVATION IN A RESTIVE
AGE: THE DEMAND FOR SECULAR
SALVATION HAS NOT ABATED
Steven J. Eaglet
In contemporary America, there is a widespread sense of anxiety.
Personal safety cannot be taken for granted in an age of terrorism.'
Dangers to children appear to lurk at every turn.2 Lurid interest in mo-
lestation proxies concerns about youthful sexuality and adult erotic
impulses.3 In an era of meritocracy, the need for status and wealth to
be revalidated in each generation leads parents to seek for their off-
spring a toehold on success through one-on-one prep courses for their
nursery school admissions exam.4 Economic insecurity grows apace,
both among those with lower incomes
5 and the middle class. 6
Although Americans purport to be as religious as ever, they hardly
are dogmatic about their faith.7 They eschew imposing their religious
values on others, and thus largely forego invoking religious norms as
a basis for societal organization or public policy. It would seem-at
t Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Va. 22201
(seagle@gmu.edu).
I See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, A Nation Challenged- The Mood; Vigilance Is Personal When
Threat Is Invisible, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at BI (describing one post-September 11, 2001
interviewee as "see[ing] government as the only institution powerful enough to protect him and
other Americans," and another as stating: "[y]ou need to take your own precautions, I don't
think the government can do anything").
2 See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of
Fear, 2000 WIs. L. REv. 519 (2000).
3 See, e.g., Christopher G. Brown, Book Note, Erotic Innocence: The Culture of Child
Molesting, 2 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 199, 200 (2000) (describing the author, James R. Kincaid, as
asserting that society is "balancing its view that children are icons of eroticism with its view that
any sexual response toward children is reprehensible" and that "[t]his balancing allows the
eroticism of children to be viewed and experienced under the guise of the search for justice
against the molesting monsters of society").
4 See, e.g., Suein Hwang, Pre-K Prep. How Young Is Too Young for Tutoring?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 13, 2004, at DI.
5 See, e.g., Frank Munger, Can We Save the Safety Net?, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 543
(2004) (arguing that welfare programs that should protect citizens from "the ravages of the
market increasingly link economic security and relief from poverty exclusively to successful
employment").
6 See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker, Middle-Class Tightrope. It's More Dire than the Numbers
Show, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2004, at A 19.
7 See generally, ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION (2003).
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least among the educated elites-that organized religion is not the
answer to growing personal concerns.8
How does a troubled and operationally secular educated society
find the good life? For most of the last century, the most commonly
proffered answers were the inexorable march of history, the helping
hand of altruistic expertise, the creation of institutions that liberate
individuals' capacity for action, and immersion in the self.
The first vehicle to earthly salvation, "scientific" socialism,
achieved inevitability in the form of its own implosion. Marxism was
no more able to propagate the "New Soviet Man" through indoctrina-
tion of members of society than Stalin's scientist Lysenko was able to
propagate the new breeds of improved plants by modifying living
specimens. 9 Even Fabian Socialism was not able to deliver the
goods. 10
The last named vehicle for salvation, immersion in the self, has
faded too.1 1 In his briefly famous The Greening of America,12 then-
Yale law professor Charles Reich earnestly observed that those reach-
8 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001) (noting "the pervasive secularism that came to
dominate American public life, especially among educated elites, a secularism that does not so
much deny religious belief as seek to confine it to a private sphere"); see also William P. Mar-
shall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of National Crisis and
Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 28 (2002) (stating that "a regime of secularism.., works
as if it is the chosen ideology"). Marshall notes that 87 percent of Americans believe that relig-
ion is "very important" or "fairly important." Id. at 15.
9 Trofim Lysenko, the agronomist in charge of Soviet agriculture, advocated the doctrine
that characteristics acquired through environmental influences are inherited. While consistent
with Marxist orthodoxy, his views were rejected after Stalin's death in favor of more conven-
tional genetics. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REV. 715, 769-71 (1994) (discussing the rise of
Lysenko under Stalin and the disastrous impact of his theories on Soviet agriculture).
10 The notion that centralized planning could coordinate satisfying the needs of entire so-
cieties demonstrated the intellectual's tendency towards "the fatal conceit that man is able to
shape the world around him according to his wishes." F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT 27
(1988). Its implementation on a more local and neighborly basis was not successful either. As
Oscar Wilde observed, "The trouble with socialism is that it takes too many evenings." BARRY
DAY, OSCAR WILDE 238 (2000). That the naturally talented people of India were held back from
developing a vibrant economy for fifty years by Fabian doctrines and the conversion of India
from a bastion of socialism to a nation more receptive to individual enterprise has been widely
commented upon. See, e.g., Deirdre McCloskey, Thomas L. Freidman, The Lexus and the Olive
Tree: Understanding Globalization (1999); John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global
Capitalism (1998), 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 121, 132 (2000) (book review).
I For an entertaining illustration of the after-glow of that mellow age, see DAVID B. SEN-
TELLE, JUDGE DAVE AND THE RAINBOW PEOPLE (2002) (detailing the author's, a conservative
federal judge, account of his mediation between park police and an unauthorized week-long
encampment of thousands of naked hippies).
12 CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (lst ed. 1970) [hereinafter, REICH,
GREENING]. The book rose to the top position in The New York Times best seller list on Decem-
ber 27, 1970. See http://www.hawes.com/nols nf.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2004). Reich subse-
quently recounted his quest in a painfully revealing autobiography, CHARLES A. REICH, SOR-
CERER OF BOLINAS REEF (1976).
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ing the advanced "Consciousness III" would know that "[p]eople all
belong to the same family, whether they have met each other or
not."'13 As a postmodernist compliment (or, perhaps, insult) to the
sensibilities of its readers, the Michigan Law Review presented a 229-
page article on "Pomobabble. ' ' 4 Personalized religion, what Robert
Bellah and his colleagues referred to as "Sheilaism,"'15 comforts its
adherents but the very quality of its personalization makes them dis-
inclined to proselytize. It might be that shopping for a befitting relig-
ion is just another shopping experience.' 6 While what one might call
overt narcissism appears to be declining, 7 it might have become sub-
limated into the search for authenticity' 8 and aesthetic experience. 19
That leaves us with only the second and third visions of the good
life on earth. One might describe them explicitly through the lenses of
Progressivism and Libertarianism. But Americans generally are not
sticklers for labels, and delivering the goods means delivering the
consumer goods. The cornucopia is filled with possessions.
IS CAMBRIDGE OR CHICAGO THE FOURTH ROME?
In past eras, a priestly class guided our passage towards salvation
and away from eternal fires. Given the need to combine our desire for
increasingly available material comforts with a coherent story around
which the good life could be fashioned, it should not be a surprise that
leading contenders for the modem priestly class are competing
13 REICH, GREENING, supra note 12, at 227 (quoted in Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politi-
cally Correct Law Review Articles, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 233, 251 n. 136 (1999)).
14 Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning"
for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997) (footnote within title omitted).
15 See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART (1996). "Sheilaism" is the name
the authors ascribed to the faith of a woman they interviewed, Sheila Larsen, who professed to
believe in God, but stated that one's goal should be to "love yourself and be gentle with your-
self" and to listen to one's own little voice. Id. at 235. Under this approach, the authors con-
clude, God simply becomes "the self magnified." Id
16 See Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Prac-
tice and Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 164 (2003). French notes that
"[s]hopping for a new church, temple, or religious affiliation is now commonplace." Further-
more, "polls indicate that one half of those responding have changed their religious denomina-
tions at least once during their lifetimes." Id. (citing WADE CLARK ROOF & WILLIAM MCKIN-
NEY, AMERICAN MAINLINE RELIGION (1987)).
17 See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1980).
18 The search to emulate those who unselfconsciously are what they are leads the con-
sciously striving well-off to buy homes in such places as Charlottesville, Virginia (prototypical
home of gentry who are natural aristocrats of talent) and Bozeman, Montana (home of laconic
ranchers who eke out a living among majestic mountains and bracing winters).
19 See DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW UPPER CLASS AND How THEY
GOT THERE (2000) (noting that "bobos," the contemporary meld of bourgeoisie and bohemians,
lead the expansive upper-middle class life of business executives and professionals while pro-
fessing devotion to the verities of the simple life through consumption of very expensive kitchen
equipment, primitive art, and eco-tourism).
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schools of economics. In his book Economics as Religion,20 econo-
mist Robert Nelson examines this quest. Building upon his earlier
book, Reaching for Heaven on Earth,21 Nelson burnishes and expands
upon his earlier thesis that contemporary schools of economics are, in
some sense, successors to earlier theological movements.
In Economics as Religion, Nelson focuses primarily on two arche-
typical figures. Paul Samuelson wrote the enormously influential in-
troductory text, Economics,22 that brought the Progressive ethic and
Keynesian thought to countless thousands of college classroom. Mil-
ton Friedman is the leading popularizer and a leading theorist of the
Chicago school of economics, which champions free markets. In jux-
taposition, Samuelson and Friedman illustrate both the promise and
perils of big government and rugged individualism.
SAMUELSON'S OLD TIME RELIGION OF PROGRESSIVISM
As Nelson notes, post-Depression trauma and the horrors of World
War II led to popular disillusionment with the old Christian idealist
style of Progressivism. Idealism needed a more scientific basis.23
Samuelson filled the bill, substituting for direct governmental action
"scientific management of the market," while retaining the Progres-
sive belief that "the material conditions of a person's existence will
shape his or her behavior in ethical and other dimensions beyond eco-
nomics. 24 Macroeconomics was king, and the traditional economics
of the firm was relegated to the second half of the book. After Alvin
Hanson25 and Samuelson brought John Maynard Keynes to America
in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the notion that experts
could regulate the economy, thus eliminating bubbles and panics,
grew in apparent infallibility. This culminated in Richard Nixon's
famous 1971 declaration: "We are all Keynesians now., 26
Samuelson's credentials as "scientist" have continued to grace his
work.27 Such statements often preface subjective public policy
20 ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND
BEYOND (2001).
21 ROBERT H. NELSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN ON EARTH (1991).
22 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1948). Nelson uses this First Edition as his
"benchmark" of Samuelson's views. NELSON, supra note 20, at 49.
23 NELSON, supra note 20, at 52.
24 Id. at 53.
25 See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Alvin Hansen, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTION-
ARY OF ECONOMICS 591 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). Like Samuelson, Hansen's "social
philosophy was expressed 'in the democratic ideal of providing for all individuals a reasonable
approach to equality of opportunity."' Id.
26 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, Two LUCKY PEOPLE 231 (1998) (quot-
ing Nixon's statement from a 1965 article in Time magazine).
27 See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (16th ed. 1998). The
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prescriptions, not the least those of lawyers.28 In spite of this
antiseptic description, however, Samuelson was sometimes not
adverse to applying moral judgments to the conduct of economic
actors, even in the First Edition. Thus, monopoly pricing was not
merely wasteful, it was "evil., 29  Samuelson's philosophy is
articulated perhaps most plainly in his preface to the 1998 fiftieth
anniversary Sixteenth Edition.3 °
Because of "the poor we have always with us," the modem
democratic state has evolved everywhere into a "mixed econ-
omy"--neither pure laissez-faire market mechanism nor
Robin Hood utopia. Alas, only by their study of the rudiments
of economics can the citizenry understand and decide about
where should lie the golden mean between the selfishness of
individual initiative and the regulatory, stabilizing, and redis-
tributive functions of government. The mixed economy must,
perforce, be the "limited mixed economy.'
In the body of the Sixteenth Edition, Samuelson makes plain the
normative purposes of economics: "Society must find the right bal-
ance between the discipline of the market and the generosity of the
welfare state. By using cool heads to inform our warm hearts, eco-
nomic science can do its part in ensuring a prosperous and just soci-
ety."32 By a "just society," Samuelson means at least a largely egali-
tarian society. "Markets do not necessarily produce a fair distribution
of income. A market economy may produce unacceptably high levels
of inequality of income and consumption. 33
At the twilight of his career, Samuelson seemed determined to re-
buke critics of government. He summarized their concerns, such as
that the state is overly intrusive and that government failures are as
publisher's one-paragraph description of Professor Samuelson at the beginning of the 50th anni-
versary edition notes his "many scientific writings," and states that he is "[o]ne of those rare
scientists who can communicate with the lay public." Id. at v.
28 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 25
(1993) (noting that traditional lawyers were happy to be considered as "a kind of scientist, even
as a kind of social scientist," thereby "surrendering any claim to originality, vision, or audacity
in exchange for society's acknowledging his possession of unchallengeable expertise within
however narrow a sphere of social governance").
29 NELSON, supra note 20, at 75 (quoting SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 127).
30 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 27, at xxiv-xxvii. Nordhaus, who served on
President Jimmy Carter's Council of Economic Advisers and who taught at Yale, had joined as
coauthor several editions earlier. The statement, "A Golden Birthday," is signed solely by
Samuelson.
31 Id. at xxiv.
32 Id. at 7. While the text is coauthored, Samuelson makes it clear that he selected Nord-
haus as his collaborator in part because Nordhaus admired his views. Id. at xxvi.
33 Id. at 37.
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pervasive as market failures, concluding that "for some, government
is the problem rather than the solution. 34
These views remind us how easy it is to take the achieve-
ments of the last century for granted. They remind us of the
tendency to credit ourselves for successes while blaming oth-
ers-particularly the government-for failures.... Diatribes
against government forget the many successes of collective
action over the last century.35
In spite of Samuelson's invocation of "market failure," he devotes
only a skimpy two paragraphs to social choice theory and public
choice theory.36 Social choice considers the fact that, when faced with
more than two choices, with no clear majority for any one of them, no
rational way of determining a group preference may exist,3 7 and that
the problem of determining a method of aggregating collective wel-
fare is intractable.3 8 This lends considerable doubt to the proposition
that legislative bodies are competent to legislate for what truly is the
general welfare. 39 Public choice theory posits that legislators, execu-
tive branch officials, and agency administrators are in business for
themselves; that is, they are motivated by the same types of incentives
that motivate their counterparts in the private sector. It is not surpris-
ing that Samuelson, and others who believe in the power of govern-
ment to accomplish important goals, have trouble accepting the view
that "legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other
goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that derive
the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social welfare. ' °
34 Id. at 39 (citation omitted). Notably, Samuelson cites only PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING
PROSPERITY (1994), which is congenial to his views, and not to individual critics of expansive
government. The first two-thirds of Krugman's somewhat polemical work was a harsh critique
of Reaganomics, and the last third a critique of Clintonomics. The subtext of the entire book
was a warning against the intellectual corruption that besets professors who venture from aca-
demia to engage in public policy battles. Krugman subsequently became a columnist for the
New York Times, with predictable results.
35 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 27, at 39.
36 Id. at 287-88.
37 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); Maxwell
L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1221-22 (1994)
(arguing that without a "clear majority" there is no "rational means of aggregating individual
preferences").
38 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE lI 2-3 (1989) (arguing that it is problematic
to try to aggregate social choice to satisfy a normative criteria).
39 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1822 (1992) (declaring that
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem "cautions" that democratic rule might not be inherently desir-
able).
40 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
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In Nelson's view, the eclipse of Cambridge was due to a change in
the American ethos. If, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, "the
United States was 'capitalism living in an oxygen tent,""4 then ac-
cording to Samuelson, the "most impressive economic performance
ever recorded" occurred in the third-quarter of the twentieth century,
and was due to increased government involvement.42 It may well be
true, as Samuelson added, that the return to normal growth and pros-
perity was accompanied by "increased skepticism" about govern-
ment's proper role.43 Nelson expressed the change in the direction
from which people would seek economic salvation more broadly:
From the 1960s onward, social values in American life would
change rapidly. The value system of Economics no longer fit
the prevailing American ethos as well as it had in the first two
decades of its existence .... It was not a coincidence ... that
Chicago replaced Cambridge as the focal point for American
economics. Chicago exhibited a hostility to many of the pro-
jects of the American progressive tradition just as progressive
ideas and institutions were losing favor in American society.
If MIT had been the center in the United States for the evolv-
ing self-concept of economics as a "science," the founder of
the Chicago school, Frank Knight, rejected both the goal it-
self and the practical feasibility of the scientific management
of society.44
THE QUEST FOR REIFICATION OF "THE MARKET" AND
"THE GOVERNMENT"
In the last decades of the twentieth century, some policy experts
and public officials were proposing that traditional government pro-
grams be replaced with ventures in which public agencies and the
market would work in tandem. Samuelson's "limited mixed econ-
omy" largely would be instantiated through projects in which, as the
captivating phrase put it, government would steer and the market
would row.45 An important illustration is the morphing of "slum
clearance" into "urban revitalization." The eradication of blighted
neighborhoods through condemnation and retransfer to private devel-
opers won accolades from the Supreme Court a half-century ago.46
41 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 27, at 38-39 (quoting Joseph Schumpeter).
42 Id. at 39 (emphasis deleted).
43 Id.
- NELSON, supra note 20, at 17-18.
45 See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT 25 (1992).
46 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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Recently, the Supreme Court held that the condemnation of sound
housing and retransfer for private projects for the more expansive
purpose of economic development passes muster under the Public
Use Clause47 as well.
48
As might be expected, some dissented from government steering
of the market on the ground that government could not formulate co-
herent and effective policy.49 However, there is a more fundamental
ground for objection. In his Nobel economics prize address in Stock-
holm, James Buchanan noted that our satisfaction with the beneficial
results produced by individuals who trade within markets and who
utilize the political process have been subject to a "subtle shift toward
a teleological interpretation. '  "' [T]he market' came to be interpreted
functionally, as if something called 'the economy' existed for the
purpose of value maximization." 51 "The polity" came to be viewed in
a similar manner.5 2 The nature of the process is such that the values of
individual participants are maximized, "without the necessity of in-
troducing an external evaluative criterion., 53 However, "[t]his 'value-
maximization' perspective cannot be extended from the market to
politics since the latter does not directly embody the incentive com-
patible structure of the former. 54
CHICAGO AS PROSELYTIZER OF PRACTICAL REFORM
While Samuelson termed Keynes the twentieth century's "greatest
economist," 55 he has given Milton Friedman relatively little recogni-
tion.56 Others, as Nelson relates, did give Friedman the "economist of
47 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
48 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (sustaining as "public use" con-
demnation of sound residential area for redevelopment as office and research facility, hotel, and
upscale residences).
49 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 958 (2003) (asserting that, largely due to
problems in the procurement and analysis of information, "[F.A.] Hayek's theory of law... is
based on a profound skepticism about the institutional competence of both courts and legisla-
tures relative to that of the market, even in advanced modem societies").






55 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 27, at 734.
56 Samuelson does not mention, for instance, Friedman's contribution that led to his Nobel
Prize, MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1867-1960 (1963). See also Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 312 n.36 (1987) (describing Friedman & Schwartz's A
Monetary History of the United States, as the "seminal critique of the performance of the Fed-
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the century" accolade, for his books "articulat[ing] the importance of
free markets and the dangers of undue government intervention.,
57
Friedman's public personality is that of proselytizer. Nelson asserts,
however, that although Samuelson and Friedman would utilize differ-
ent means, they advocated similar ends. Noting that liberal politicians
had taken up such Friedmanite ideas as charter schools (a variant on
tuition vouchers) and the negative income tax, he concludes:
Besides having a greater zeal for political combat, Friedman
had also thought more deeply than Samuelson about many of
the practical problems of governing. If Samuelson was the
leading preacher of neoprogressive values in his textbook
Economics and other writings, Friedman was the master tech-
nician. In terms of doing concrete, practical things to make
the system work, as opposed to making symbolic statements
of ideals, in the end it was Friedman, not Samuelson, who
was the truer progressive.58
If Friedman was the advocate of harmonizing a higher material
standard of living with individual freedom, the work of his Chicago
colleague, Gary Becker, touched much closer to the nerve of social
concern at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
In his seminal examination of the family,59 and in other areas in-
cluding discrimination, the basis for individual tastes, and human
capital, Becker has applied economic analysis to areas of life that are
removed from those traditionally associated with the marketplace.
60
Since economics considers methods to maximize achievement of
one's goals in a world of scarcity, Becker's insights have proven ana-
lytically powerful in many contexts and captured the public imagina-
tion. One result is to rouse the concern of some in modern industrial
nations that their lives are becoming more impoverished even as their
societies are becoming materially richer. This fear was summed up by
the Socialist former French Premier Lionel Jospin, who often is
quoted as saying that he is in favor of a market economy, not a market
61
society.
eral Reserve as lender of last resort during the Great Depression").
57 NELSON, supra note 20, at 150 (quoting Norman Pearlstein, a former managing editor
of the Wall Street Journal and later editor-in-chief of Time).
58 Id.
59 GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991).
60 Richard A. Posner, a former Chicago law professor and now a Seventh Circuit federal
judge, also has found this field a fertile one, considering the economics of old age, sex, and
adoptions, among other topics.
61 Raymond J. Friel, Blair's Third Way--Thatcher's Enduring Legacy, 48 U. KAN. L.
REv. 861, 862 n.3 (2000).
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CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF COMMODIFICATION AND RATIONALITY
The Progressive and Keynesian movements were ascendant during
the first two-thirds of the last century and the ideas of free markets
and individual autonomy that were in resurgence during the last third.
Together, they provide Americans with an ambivalent sense about the
role of economics in determining the path to salvation in the twenty-
first century. Markets lead to distributions of wealth that are unequal,
and perhaps inequitable. However, even Samuelson notes the conse-
quent improvement in economic performance, and that the European
welfare state has led to "hardening of the economic arteries" and high
unemployment.6 2 While markets build individual virtue,63 they also
weaken the practice of virtue by catering to the illusion that consum-
ers always deserve to have their demands fulfilled.64 Also, at least for
those who acquired a comfortable level of material success, the old
saw seems true-money does not buy happiness.65
The materials that follow discuss some issues of contemporary im-
portance that bear upon sources of secular salvation in this century.
THE DISPLACEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS BY
MARKET TRANSACTIONS
While the technical concepts remain arcane for most, Americans
are increasingly troubled by the combined effects of factor-price
equalization and commodification. Factor-price equalization posits
that trade will bring about an equalization in relative and absolute
returns to "factors of production" (such as labor, capital, and land)
across the relevant trading area.66 By depressing the income of low-skilled workers competing against those in other countries, factor-
62 SAMUELSON & NORDHAuS, supra note 27, at 735-36.
63 See, e.g., MICHAEL NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING (1996) (analyzing the intersection
between market forces, wealth creation, and virtuous behavior); HAYEK, supra note 10 (arguing
that market efficiency encourages the practices of virtue and high-quality production).
64 See, e.g., IRVING KRiSTOL, TWO CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM ix-xiv (1978) (denying the
third cheer because of the alleged amoral character of free market societies).
65 See Robert E. Lane, Friendship, Consumerism, and Happiness, 8 CRITICAL REV. 521
(1994) (collecting studies).
6 Chantal Thomas, Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States,
41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 18 (2004). Barriers to trade, such as transportation costs and protective
legislation, however, will reduce the equalizing effects. See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized
Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 1147, 1150 & n.7 (1997) (discussing barriers and their costs in the world economy).
Interestingly, the concept of factor-price equalization was developed in part by Paul Samuelson
contemporaneously with publication of the first edition of Economics in 1948. Paul A.
Samuelson, International Trade and the Equalisation of Factor Prices, 58 ECON. J. 163, 165-84
(1948); Paul A. Samuelson, International Factor-Price Equalisation Once Again, 59 ECON. J.
181, 181-97 (1949).
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price equalization is a contributing cause of the rising disparity of
income in the United States.67
While it was the concern de jour of the 2004 presidential election,
outsourcing has been an ongoing process. A century ago, an upper-
middle-class family would have its live-in cook and maid. Now those
functions are outsourced to restaurants and contract cleaning services.
Likewise, firms increasingly are outsourcing non-core components of
their business, such as payroll and cleaning. Outsourcing abroad is the
latest wrinkle. In all of these cases, one element is to reduce the inter-
action of employer and employee (or, now more accurately, vendor
employee) to a nexus of contracts. Of course, this process aids the
economy in the aggregate and factor price-equalization is a fact of
life. However, while some favor the entrepreneurial life, many work-
ers-perhaps most-prefer personal security.
Related to the tendency towards equilibration of wages in the
United States with those of less developed countries is the perception
that the notion of a sphere in which the market reigns has become
overextended.68 In a well-known analysis, Margaret Jane Radin pos-
ited a world of "universal commodification":
[A]nything some people are willing to sell and others are
willing to buy in principle can and should be the subject of
free market exchange. Moreover, universal commodification
means that everything people need or desire, either individu-
ally or in groups, is conceived of as a commodity. "Every-
thing" includes not only those things usually considered
goods, but also personal attributes, relationships, and states of
affairs. Under universal commodification, the functions of
government, wisdom, a healthful environment, and the right
to bear children are all commodities.69
As one commonplace example of items not generally considered in
the stream of commerce a generation ago not being commodities,
civic fora like arts centers, which might have been named for a local-
ity or major donor, have become the subject of "naming rights." With
naming rights, people seek the best possible deal for themselves and
their families.70 Gated communities have developed in a "secession of
67 See, e.g., LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG
JAPAN, EUROPE AND AMERICA 52-53 (1992) (noting that low-skill wages have fallen as per
capita GNP has risen).
68 See generally, MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (criticizing market
forces for encouraging inequality and domination).
69 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1860 (1987).
70 See, e.g., ROBERT REICH, THE FUTURE OF SUCCESS 174-75 (2000) (noting how families
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the successful," so that "[i]n many cities and towns, the wealthy have
in effect withdrawn their dollars from the support of public spaces
and institutions shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own
private services."71
Similarly, leading universities are becoming more commercially
engaged. As an indication of their changed orientation, the "experi-
mental use exception" that universities have enjoyed from patent in-
fringement actions for almost two-hundred years72 may be ending.
Schools are now viewed as commercial competitors.73 In Madey v.
Duke University,74 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
observed that "Duke, . . . like other major research institutions of
higher learning, [was] not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent licens-
ing program from which it derive[d] a not insubstantial revenue
stream.
75
Also, public confidence in various American institutions seems to
be decreasing.76 Disparities in income are increasing.77 Even within
individual professions or occupations, the fraternal spirit of the part-
nership or guild largely has given way to the admonition that "you eat
what you kill."78 Building upon an article by the Chicago economist
are making rational choices in light of the changing modem economy).
71 EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA 186 (1994) (quoting Robert B. Reich, Secession of the
Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 16).
72 See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600)(explaining that an exception exists to use an inventor's patent where an actor is determining
whether the invention actually works as claimed by the patent holder); Deuterium Corp. v.
United States, 19 CI. Ct. 624, 631 n.12 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (characterizing the experimental use doc-
trine as both an "exception" and a "defense"); Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of
Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF Soc'Y 357, 363-75 (1957) (detailing the
history of the development of the exception).
73 See Bernard Wysocki Jr., A Laser Case Sears Universities' Right To Ignore Patents,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2004, at Al ("These days, big research universities use their formidable
powers for far more than teaching and scholarly inquiry. They invest in top scientists, create big
labs, team up with companies and spawn commercial spinoffs.").
74 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). On remand, the university could not prove its entitle-
ment to the exception. 336 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590 n.2 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
75 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 n.7.
76 See, e.g., Jay Tolson, The Media on Trial, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 6, 2004, at
78 (noting that although a Gallup survey in 1976 found that about seven in ten Americans
trusted the media, a recent study by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found
that 53 percent do not trust what news organizations report).
77 See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2003, at 459 No. 688 (123d ed. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/
03statab/income.pdf (noting that the percent distribution of aggregate income received by the
lowest fifth of families went from 5.3 percent in 1980 to 4.2 percent in 2001). Between 1980
and 2001, the percentage received by the top 5 percent of families went from 14.6 precent to
21.0 percent. Id.
78 See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Creating a Life as a Lawyer, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 37, 42-
43 (2003) (discussing how "eat what you kill" and the pressure for producing more billable
hours may lead to professional dissatisfaction); Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze,
49 VILL. L. REv. 867, 882-83 (2004) (describing how "eat what you kill" may lead to complic-
ECONOMIC SALVATION IN A RESTIVE A GE
Sherwin Rosen,79 Robert Frank and Philip Cook have written a book
attempting to demonstrate that it is increasingly true that the "winner
takes all."8°
The purpose of this litany is not to suggest that these criticisms are
necessarily valid, 81 or even that there is some inherent connection be-
tween people's preferences and their well-being. 82 It is simply to
point out that those perceiving a greater need for salvation from soci-
ety's ills are more apt to seek economists and others sharing their
worldview as secular redeemers.
INCOMMENSURABILITY AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
We should engage in an act if the value of the act exceeds its costs.
Putting this axiom into effect, however, requires the ability to com-
pare the values and costs of performing (and not performing) the act
using the same metric. Market goods are commensurable because
their value might be compared by the same metric, price in dollars.
Sometimes, however, the value of things might be incommensu-
rate.83 Also, intrinsic in the nature of a pursuit or relationship might
be the "belief that certain options are not comparable in value. 84 Jo-
seph Raz concluded that "[o]nly those who hold the view that friend-
ship is neither better nor worse than money, but is simply not compa-
rable to money or other commodities are capable of having friends.
8 5
Similarly, Ernest Weinrib has argued that private law, including the
law of property and torts, is, like love, valuable in itself and not
merely functional.86 This is a view that utilitarians do not share.87
ity in client wrongdoing).
79 Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 (1981).
80 ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 6 (1995) (ar-
guing that the increase in disproportionately high salaries is closely tied to the growth of com-
petitive forces).
81 See, e.g., TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE (1998) (arguing that the
expanding scope of markets adds to human well-being).
82 See, e.g., David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 351,
365-66 (2002) (reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(2002)) (noting the problems that exist in connecting people's well-being with their individual
preferences).
83 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986) ("A and B are incom-
mensurate if it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal
value.").
84 Id. at 356 (terming such beliefs "constitutive incommensurabilities").
85 Id. at 352.
86 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6 (1995) ("Love is its own end. My
contention is that, in this respect, private law is just like love.").
87 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713, 715 (1989) ("Laws are something made by men for the governance of
mankind.").
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Their issue of commensurability is important partly because cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) increasingly is used under legislative mandate
to determine if the benefits derived from government regulations ex-
ceed their costs.88 Although CBA intuitively seems desirable, the
concept is controversial, with some asserting that the methodology of
cost-benefit analysis is flawed.89 One reason, of course, is simply that
CBA is often hard to do accurately.
Economically traded goods are valued in terms of the opportunities
foregone in creating them. As Nelson notes, this would mean that
Samuelson regarded the trip of a van moving the goods of a dislo-
cated worker as entailing economic costs. Although, the "psychic
pain" incurred by the uprooted worker would not be treated as a
"real" cost.90 The frustration incurred by those suffering such costs
has considerable political consequences. 91
CBA will not take into account systematic errors in cognition or
that differences in "willingness to pay" might reflect only the fact that
some people have less money than others. 92 Beyond that, concentra-
tion on the metric of market value can distract society from signifi-
cant issues, such as the "tragic question" of what to do when the
available choices require "serious moral wrongdoing., 93
Along these same lines, deep ecologists have completely rejected
the use of cost-benefit analysis in fashioning environment regulations.
They argue, for example, "that if access to nature is a right, then cost-
benefit analysis breaks down. In other words, there is no amount of
money which can compensate for irreversible and irreparable damage
to nature." 94 Others assert that future generations have "inviolable
88 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions
for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1343, 1344-45 (2002) (discussing the
growth of cost-benefit analysis in legislative rulemaking).
89 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 913, 929-30 (2000) (suggesting that bias exists in much cost-benefit analysis meth-
odology).
90 NELSON, supra note 20, at 66; see SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 27, at 735
("Ours is the 'ruthless economy' ... [o]ld-fashion loyalty to firm or community counts for
little.").
91 Indeed, former Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan criticized fellow
Republican conservatives for accepting without question the full costs of the "market process,"
stating that "unbridled capitalism is ... an awesome destructive force" making people "obsolete
as rapidly as ... the products they produce and the plants that employ them." NELSON, supra
note 20, at 66 n.* (quoting Patrick Buchanan, Schism Beyond Repair on the Right?, WASH.
TiMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at A19).
92 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 168 (1999) (arguing that agencies may need to modify or depart from their traditional
understanding of cost-benefit analysis where parties exhibit unequal values of wealth).
93 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 29 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1005, 1005 (2000).
94 Edwin R. McCullough, Through the Eye of a Needle: The Earth's Hard Passage Back
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rights" to environmental resources, thus attacking the familiar prac-
tice of discounting future enjoyment when determining the present
value of environmental amenities.
95
Since many environmental amenities are not traded, no prices in-
dicate their benefits. Passive enjoyment of amenities do not generate
output that might be measured. The contingent valuation method has
been used by some researchers to survey how much a representative
sample population values passive environmental uses.9 6 These passive
uses include "option value," which measures willingness to pay to
reserve the right to use the resource in the future, and "existence




A key to salvation in the secular society is that decisions be based
on reason.98 However, choices seem more complicated and less reli-
able than ever. This is due to a lack of reliable mechanisms to analyze
information and make decisions within society. It may also be due to
a lack of reliable cognitive mechanisms within individuals.
While professional advisers ought to bring to bear objective exper-
tise, their self-interest as independent market actors clearly makes
them unreliable sources of counsel. 99 As public choice theory informs
us, government agencies are not to be relied upon either, for the same
reason. 
100
Indeed, continuing from public choice theory to social choice the-
ory, we learn that there is no satisfactory way that the preferences of
to Health, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 389, 436-37 (1995) (citing ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY, COM-
MUNITY AND LIFESTYLE (David Rothenberg trans., & ed., 1989)). McCollough notes that
"Naess coined the term 'deep ecology' in 1973." Id. at 415.
95 Id. at 437 n. 180 (quoting Clive L. Splash, Economics, Ethics, and Long-Term Environ-
mental Damages, 15 ENvTL. ETHICS 117, 127 (1993)).
96 E.g., Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering
Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493,
494 (1994); see also John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 331 (1995) (presenting a thorough account of the uses and limitations of the technique).
97 Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 140, 145 (1999).
98 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Reaffirming Legal Reasoning: The Challenge from the Left,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 358, 368 (1986) (declaring that "[i]n a society that cares about justice...
decision making based on reason ... not preference or faith, is crucial for legitimacy").
99 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECoN. 305, 308 (1976) (stressing
that agents do not make optimal decisions from the principal's viewpoint).
100 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986) (noting that
market forces provide incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve the highest-bidding
private interests).
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members of a democratic society could be amalgamated into a single
social choice. 10' In part, this is because Arrow's Theorem demon-
strates that "no social choice mechanism can be both rational and de-
mocratic. In part also, it is because "no minimally rational social
choice mechanism can simultaneously respect liberal rights and the
Pareto principle-the principle that if at least one person prefers a
state of affairs to the alternatives and no one opposes it, the social
choice mechanism should pick that state of affairs."' 0 3
If social institutions are not reliable guides to rational decisions,
might an individual trust his own analysis? Departing from the tradi-
tional Chicago model of people as rational seekers of their own self-
interest, an increasing number of economists are saying "no." For in-
stance, Professor Cass Sunstein asserts that cost-benefit analysis is
most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds-as a way of
counteracting predictable problems in individual and social
cognition. Poor judgments, by individuals and societies, can
result from certain heuristics, from informational and reputa-
tional cascades, from thinking processes in which benefits are
"on screen" but costs are not, from ignoring systemic effects
of one-shot interventions, from seeing cases in isolation, and
from intense emotional reactions. 104
One array of cognitive errors is explored by "prospect theory,"
which suggests that individuals value things that they possess more
than things that they do not possess, but are in fact of equivalent
value, and that they take irrational gambles on prospective losses.10 5
The discipline of experimental economics, which conducts experi-
ments to test economic interactions, was pioneered by Vernon Smith,
whose work "has repeatedly demonstrated that markets do not operate
as traditional economics assumes."' 0 6 Contrary to traditional eco-
101 See, e.g., David Luban, Social Choice Theory as Jurisprudence, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
521, 521 (1996).
1021d. (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed.
1963)).
103ld. at 521-22 (citing AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE(1970); Amartya Sen, The Impossibility ofa Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970)).
104Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1059, 1059
(2000).
105 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (introducing prospect theory as a critical
response to utility theory). See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and
the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251 (1986).
106 Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1775 n.585 (2003) (noting that Smith shared the Nobel
Prize with Daniel Kahneman); see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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nomic assumptions, "people do not behave in accordance with ra-
tional man theory."' 7
Delving beneath these insights developed from behavioral obser-
vations, the new research field of neuroeconomics 10 8 utilizes neuroi-
maging to examine behavior in economic games.109 In one experi-
ment, for instance, magnetic resonance imaging indicated that some
brain areas showed greater activation for unfair compared with fair
(money split 50:50) offers, with the magnitude of activation signifi-
cantly greater where the unfair offers were made by human partners
as opposed to computer partners. I10
From neurology, it is a short skip into the study of the more gen-
eral biological bases for human behavior and the adaptability of man
to more efficient survival behaviors and changing conditions. The
field of evolutionary biology deals with this terrain."' There has been
a rich interplay between economics and biology," 12 and Chicago-style
economists and lawyers remain fascinated with Darwinism, both in its
social version and straight from the source:
The classical evolutionary paradigm has a strong grip on law
and economics scholarship. What survives is presumptively
efficient: if it were inefficient, the practice, the law, or the
custom would be challenged by its more efficient competi-
tors. The success of the more efficient practice or law allows
it to prosper, while its less efficient competitors wither and
die. 113
The suggestion is that the forces of biology and economics are in-
tertwined. Indeed, if the "market can decide if genetic modifications
should be rewarded" when it comes to crops,' 4 is the next step far in
the distance?
107 Prentice, supra note 106, at 1175 n.585 (citing Chris Giles, Economists Get the Idea,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 2002, at 13, available at 2002 WLNR 6766995).
0 8 See Terrence R. Chorvat, Perception and Income: The Behavioral Economics of the
Realization Doctrine, 36 CONN. L. REV. 75, 110 n.232 (2003) (noting that the term "neu-
roeconomics" was coined by Kevin McCabe in 1996).
109 Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and the Cognitive Revolution, 78 TUL. L. REV.
1501, 1541 n.214 (20 0 4).
110 Id. (citing Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the
Ultimatum Game, 300 SCIENCE 1755 (2003)).
1 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law ofLaw's Leverage: Be-
havioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001) (discussing the
interaction of human behavior, economic theory, and the law).
112See, e.g., GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTION (1993) (discussing
how human behavior meshes with and influences economic theory).
"3 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641
(1996).
114 Carlos Scott L6pez, Intellectual Property Reform for Genetically Modified Crops: A
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CONCLUSION
It might be that the next generation of economists will work to-
ward man's salvation by making conventional improvements in effi-
ciency of productive processes. Or, the imperialism of economic
forces might make each of our lives resemble that of the Charlie
Chaplinesque assembly line worker in the industrial dystopia Modern
Times. 15 Then again, economists might explain how humanity bio-
logically should be redesigned. Perhaps this will lead to salvation, but
it is all heady stuff.
As Professor Stanley Fish recently noted in an interview with the
New York Times: "Once theoretical questions cease to be questions in
the realm of philosophy and become questions about how to live our
lives, that places a great burden on theory."' 1 6 Theorists can claim to
answer vexing questions, or to lead us to the "promised land."' 17 "The
first is, of course, the appropriate claim and necessary claim made by
scholars and theorists. The second is the language of prophets or even
of gods. And theorists, thankfully, are neither prophets or gods.""' 18
While economists are not gods, they are worldly philosophers." 9
As such, their words are to be heeded, but warily.
Legal Imperative, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 367, 383 (2004).
11 MODERN TIMES (Image Entertainment 1936).
116 Emily Eakin, The Theory of Everything, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004 § 4, at 12




119 See, e.g., ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS (rev. 7th ed. 1999)(contending that history's greatest economists can be called worldly philosophers because they
"sought to embrace in a scheme of philosophy... [mans's] drive for wealth").
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